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Abstract
The study on improving the robustness of deep neural networks against adver-
sarial examples grows rapidly in recent years. Among them, adversarial training
is the most promising one, which flattens the input loss landscape (loss change
with respect to input) via training on adversarially perturbed examples. However,
how the widely used weight loss landscape (loss change with respect to weight)
performs in adversarial training is rarely explored. In this paper, we investigate
the weight loss landscape from a new perspective, and identify a clear correlation
between the flatness of weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap. Sev-
eral well-recognized adversarial training improvements, such as early stopping,
designing new objective functions, or leveraging unlabeled data, all implicitly
flatten the weight loss landscape. Based on these observations, we propose a simple
yet effective Adversarial Weight Perturbation (AWP) to explicitly regularize the
flatness of weight loss landscape, forming a double-perturbation mechanism in the
adversarial training framework that adversarially perturbs both inputs and weights.
Extensive experiments demonstrate that AWP indeed brings flatter weight loss
landscape and can be easily incorporated into various existing adversarial training
methods to further boost their adversarial robustness.
1 Introduction
Although deep neural networks (DNNs) have been widely deployed in a number of fields such as
computer vision [13], speech recognition [47], and natural language processing [10], they could be
easily fooled to confidently make incorrect predictions by adversarial examples that are crafted by
adding intentionally small and human-imperceptible perturbations to normal examples [42, 12, 52, 4].
As DNNs penetrate almost every corner in our daily life, ensuring their security, e.g., improving their
robustness against adversarial examples, becomes more and more important.
There have emerged a number of defense techniques to improve adversarial robustness of DNNs
[33, 25, 48]. Across these defenses, Adversarial Training (AT) [12, 25] is the most effective and
promising approach, which not only demonstrates moderate robustness, but also has thus far not been
comprehensively attacked [2]. AT directly incorporates adversarial examples into the training process
to solve the following optimization problem:
min
w
ρ(w), where ρ(w) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
‖x′i−xi‖p≤
`(fw(x
′
i), yi), (1)
where n is the number of training examples, x′i is the adversarial example within the -ball (bounded
by an Lp-norm) centered at natural example xi, fw is the DNN with weight w, `(·) is the standard
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classification loss (e.g., the cross-entropy (CE) loss), and ρ(w) is called the “adversarial loss”
following Madry et al. [25]. Eq. (1) indicates that AT restricts the change of loss when its input is
perturbed (i.e., flattening the input loss landscape) to obtain a certain of robustness, but its robustness
is still far from satisfactory because of the huge robust generalization gap [39, 37], for example, an
adversarially trained PreAct ResNet-18 [14] on CIFAR-10 [20] only has 43% test robustness, even it
has already achieved 84% training robustness after 200 epochs (see Figure 1). Its robust generalization
gap reaches 41%, which is very different from the standard training (on natural examples) whose
standard generalization gap is always lower than 10%. Thus, how to mitigate the robust generalization
gap becomes essential for the robustness improvement of adversarial training methods.
Recalling that weight loss landscape is a widely used indicator to characterize the standard gen-
eralization gap in standard training scenario [31, 21], however, there are few explorations under
adversarial training, among which, Prabhu et al. [35] and Yu et al. [55] tried to use the pre-generated
adversarial examples to explore but failed to draw the expected conclusions. In this paper, we
explore the weight loss landscape under adversarial training using on-the-fly generated adversarial
examples, and identify a strong connection between the flatness of weight loss landscape and ro-
bust generalization gap. Several well-recognized adversarial training improvements, i.e., AT with
early stopping [37], TRADES [58], MART [49] and RST [6], all implicitly flatten the weight loss
landscape to narrow the robust generalization gap. Motivated by this, we propose an explicit weight
loss landscape regularization, named Adversarial Weight Perturbation (AWP), to directly restrict
the flatness of weight loss landscape. Different from random perturbations [15], AWP injects the
strongest worst-case weight perturbations, forming a double-perturbation mechanism (i.e., inputs
and weights are both adversarially perturbed) in the adversarial training framework. AWP is generic
and can be easily incorporated into existing adversarial training approaches with little overhead. Our
main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We identify the fact that flatter weight loss landscape often leads to smaller robust gen-
eralization gap in adversarial training via characterizing the weight loss landscape using
adversarial examples generated on-the-fly.
• We propose Adversarial Weight Perturbation (AWP) to explicitly regularize the weight loss
landscape of adversarial training, forming a double-perturbation mechanism that injects the
worst-case input and weight perturbations.
• Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that AWP consistently improves the adver-
sarial robustness of state-of-the-art methods by a notable margin.
2 Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Defense
Since the discovery of adversarial examples, many defensive approaches have been developed to
reduce this type of security risk such as defensive distillation [33], feature squeezing [53], input
denoising [3], adversarial detection [24], gradient regularization [34, 43], and adversarial training
[12, 25, 48]. Among them, adversarial training has been demonstrated to be the most effective
method [2]. Based on adversarial training, a number of new techniques are introduced to enhance its
performance further.
TRADES [58]. TRADES optimizes an upper bound of adversarial risk that is a trade-off between
accuracy and robustness:
ρTRADES(w) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
CE
(
fw(xi), yi
)
+ β ·max KL(fw(xi)‖fw(x′i))}, (2)
where KL is the Kullback–Leibler divergence, CE is the cross-entropy loss, and β is the hyperparam-
eter to control the trade-off between natural accuracy and robust accuracy.
MART [49]. MART incorporates an explicit differentiation of misclassified examples as a regularizer
of adversarial risk:
ρMART(w) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
BCE
(
fw(x
′
i), yi
)
+ λ · KL(fw(xi)‖fw(x′i)) · (1− [fw(xi)]yi)}, (3)
2
where [fw(xi)]yi denotes the yi-th element of output vector fw(xi) and BCE
(
fw(xi), yi
)
=
− log ([fw(x′i)]yi)− log (1−maxk 6=yi [fw(x′i)]k).
Semi-Supervised Learning (SSL) [6, 46, 28, 57]. SSL-based methods utilize additional unlabeled
data. They first generate pseudo labels for unlabeled data by training a natural model on the labeled
data. Then, adversarial loss ρ(w) is applied to train a robust model based on both labeled and
unlabeled data:
ρSSL(w) = ρlabeled(w) + λ · ρunlabeled(w), (4)
where λ is the weight on unlabeled data. ρlabeled(w) and ρunlabeled(w) are usually the same adversarial
loss. For example, RST in Carmon et al. [6] uses TRADES loss and semi-supervised MART in Wang
et al. [49] uses MART loss.
2.2 Robust Generalization
Compared with standard generalization (on natural examples), training DNNs with robust gener-
alization (on adversarial examples) is particularly difficult [25], and often possesses significantly
higher sample complexity [19, 54, 26] and needs more data [39]. Nakkiran [29] showed that a
model requires more capacity to be robust. Tsipras et al. [44] and Zhang et al. [58] demonstrated
that adversarial robustness may be inherently at odds with natural accuracy. Moreover, there are a
series of works studying the robust generalization from the view of loss landscape. In adversarial
training, there are two types of loss landscape: 1) input loss landscape which is the loss change with
respect to the input. It depicts the change of loss in the vicinity of training examples. AT explicitly
flattens the input loss landscape by training on adversarially perturbed examples, while there are
other methods doing this by gradient regularization [23, 38], curvature regularization [27], and
local linearity regularization [36]. These methods are fast on training but only achieve comparable
robustness with AT. 2) weight loss landscape which is the loss change with respect to the weight. It
reveals the geometry of loss landscape around model weights. Different from the standard training
scenario where numerous studies have revealed the connection between the weight loss landscape
and their standard generalization gap [17, 31, 7], whether the connection exists in adversarial training
is still under exploration. Prabhu et al. [35] and Yu et al. [55] tried to establish this connection in
adversarial training but failed due to the inaccurate weight loss landscape characterization.
Different from these studies, we characterize the weight loss landscape from a new perspective, and
identify a clear relationship between weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap.
3 Connection of Weight Loss Landscape and Robust Generalization Gap
In this section, we first propose a new method to characterize the weight loss landscape, and
then investigate it from two perspectives: 1) in the training process of adversarial training, and 2)
across different adversarial training methods, which leads to a clear correlation between weight
loss landscape and robust generalization gap. To this end, some discussions about the weight loss
landscapes are provided.
Visualization. We visualize the weight loss landscape by plotting the adversarial loss change when
moving the weight w along a random direction d with magnitude α:
g(α) = ρ(w + αd) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
‖x′i−xi‖p≤
`(fw+αd(x
′
i), yi), (5)
where d is sampled from a Gaussian distribution and filter normalized by dl,j ← dl,j‖dl,j‖F ‖wl,j‖F
(dl,j is the j-th filter at the l-th layer of d and ‖ · ‖F denotes the Frobenius norm) to eliminate the
scaling invariance of DNNs following Li et al. [21]. The adversarial loss ρ is usually approximated
by the cross-entropy loss on adversarial examples following Madry et al. [25]. Here, we generate
adversarial examples on-the-fly by PGD (attacks are reviewed in Appendix A) for the current
perturbed model fw+αd and then compute their cross-entropy loss (refer to Appendix B.1 for details).
The key difference to previous works lies on the adversarial examples used for visualization. Prabhu
et al. [35] and Yu et al. [55] used a fixed set of pre-generated adversarial examples on the original
model fw in the visualization process, which will severely underestimate the adversarial loss due
to the inconsistency between the source model (original model fw) and the target model (current
perturbed model fw+αd). Considering d is randomly selected, we repeat the visualization 10 times
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(a) In the training process of vanilla AT (Left: Learning curve;
Mid: Landscape before “best”; Right: Landscape after “best”)
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Figure 1: The relationship between weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap is investigated
a) in the training process of vanilla AT; and b) across different adversarial training methods on CIFAR-
10 using PreAct ResNet-18 and L∞ threat model. (“Landscape” is a abbr. of weight loss landscape)
with different d in Appendix B.2 and their shapes are similar and stable. Thus, the visualization
method is valid to characterize the weight loss landscape, based on which, we can carefully investigate
the connection between weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap.
The Connection in the Learning Process of Adversarial Training. We firstly show how the weight
loss landscape changes along with the robust generalization gap in the learning process of adversarial
training. We train a PreAct ResNet-18 [14] on CIFAR-10 for 200 epochs using vanilla AT with a
piece-wise learning rate schedule (initial learning rate is 0.1, and divided by 10 at the 100-th and
150-th epoch). The training and test attacks are both 10-step PGD (PGD-10) with step size 2/255
and maximum L∞ perturbation  = 8/255. The learning curve and weight loss landscape are shown
in Figure 1(a) where the “best” (highest test robustness) is at the 103-th epoch. Before the “best”,
the test robustness is close to the training robustness, thus the robust generalization gap (green line)
is small. Meanwhile, the weight loss landscape (plotted every 20 epochs) before the “best” is also
very flat. After the “best”, the robust generalization gap (green line) becomes larger as the training
continues, while the weight loss landscape becomes sharper simultaneously. The trends also exist
on other model architectures (VGG-19 [40] and WideResNet-34-10 [56]), datasets (SVHN [30]
and CIFAR-100 [20]), threat model (L2), and learning rate schedules (cyclic [41], cosine [22]), as
shown in Appendix C. Thus, the flatness of weight loss landscape is well-correlated with the robust
generalization gap during the training process.
The Connection across Different Adversarial Training Methods. Furthermore, we explore
whether the relationship between weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap still exists
across different adversarial training methods. Under the same settings as above, we train PreAct
ResNet-18 using several state-of-the-art adversarial training methods like TRADES [58], MART
[49], RST [6], and AT with Early Stopping (AT-ES) [37]. Figure 1(b) demonstrates their training/test
robustness and weight loss landscape. Compared with vanilla AT, all methods have a smaller robust
generalization gap and a flatter weight loss landscape. Although these state-of-the-art methods
improve adversarial robustness using various techniques, they all implicitly flatten the weight loss
landscape. It can be also observed that the smaller generalization gap one method achieves, the flatter
weight loss landscape it has. This observation is consistent with that in the training process, which
verifies that weight loss landscape has a strong correlation with robust generalization gap.
Does Flatter Weight Loss Landscape Certainly Lead to Higher Test Robustness? Revisiting
Figure 1(b), AT-ES has the flattest weight loss landscape (also the smallest robust generalization gap),
but does not obtain the highest test robustness. Since the robust generalization gap is defined as the
difference between training and test robustness, the low test robustness of AT-ES is caused by the low
training robustness. It indicates that early stopping technique does not make full use of the whole
training process, e.g., it stops training around 100-th epoch only with 60% training robustness which
is 20% lower than that of 200-th epoch. Therefore, a flatter weight loss landscape does directly lead
to a smaller robust generalization gap but is only beneficial to the final test robustness on condition
that the training process is sufficient (i.e., training robustness is high).
Why Do We Need Weight Loss Landscape? As aforementioned, adversarial training has already
optimized the input loss landscape via training on adversarial examples. However, the adversarial
example is generated by injecting input perturbation on each individual example to obtain the highest
adversarial loss, which is an example-wise “local” worst-case that does not consider the overall
effect on multiple examples. The weight of DNNs can influence the losses of all examples such
that it could be perturbed to obtain a model-wise “global” worst-case (highest adversarial loss over
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multiple examples). Weight perturbations can serve as a good complement for input perturbations.
Also, optimizing on perturbed weights (i.e., making the loss remains small even if perturbations are
added on the weights) could lead to a flat weight loss landscape, which further will narrow the robust
generalization gap. In the next section, we will propose such a weight perturbation for adversarial
training.
4 Proposed Adversarial Weight Perturbation
In this section, we propose Adversarial Weight Perturbation (AWP) to explicitly flatten the weight
loss landscape via injecting the worst-case weight perturbation into DNNs. As discussed above, in
order to improve the test robustness, we need to focus on both the training robustness and the robust
generalization gap (delivered by the flatness of weight loss landscape). Thus, we have the objective:
min
w
{
ρ(w) +
(
ρ(w + v)− ρ(w))}→ min
w
ρ(w + v), (6)
where ρ(w) is the original adversarial loss in Eq. (1), ρ(w + v)− ρ(w) is a term to characterize the
flatness of weight loss landscape, and v is weight perturbation that needs to be carefully selected.
4.1 Weight Perturbation
Perturbation Direction. Different from the commonly used random weight perturbation (sampling
a random direction) [50, 18, 15], we propose the Adversarial Weight Perturbation (AWP), along
which the adversarial loss increases dramatically. That is,
min
w
max
v∈V
ρ(w + v)→ min
w
max
v∈V
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
‖x′i−xi‖p≤
`(fw+v(x
′
i), yi), (7)
where V is a feasible region for the perturbation v. Similar to the adversarial input perturbation, AWP
also injects the worst-case on weights in a small region around fw. Note that the maximization on v
depends on the entire examples (at least the batch examples) to make the whole loss (not the loss on
each example) maximal, thus these two maximizations are not exchangeable.
Perturbation Size. Following the weight perturbation direction, we need to determine how much
perturbation should be injected. Different from the fixed value constraint  on adversarial inputs, we
restrict the weight perturbation vl using its relative size to the weights of l-th layer wl:
‖vl‖ ≤ γ‖wl‖, (8)
where γ is the constraint on weight perturbation size. The reasons for using relative size to constrain
weight perturbation lie on two aspects: 1) the numeric distribution of weights is different from layer
to layer, so it is impossible to constrain weights of different layers using a fixed value; and 2) there is
scale invariance on weights, e.g., when nonlinear ReLU is used, the network remains unchanged if
we multiply the weights in one layer by 10, and divide by 10 at the next layer.
4.2 Optimization
Once the direction and size of weight perturbation are determined, we propose an algorithm to
optimize the double-perturbation adversarial training problem in Eq. (7). For the two maximization
problems, we circularly generate adversarial example x′i and then update weight perturbation v both
empirically using PGD*. The procedure of AWP-based vanilla AT, named AT-AWP, is as follows.
Input Perturbation. We craft adversarial examples x′ using PGD attack on fw+v:
x′i ← Π
(
x′i + η1sign(∇x′i`(fw+v(x′i), yi))
)
(9)
where Π(·) is the projection function and v is 0 for the first iteration.
Weight Perturbation. We calculate the adversarial weight perturbation based on the generated
adversarial examples x′:
v← Πγ
(
v + η2
∇v 1m
∑m
i=1 `(fw+v(x
′
i), yi)
‖∇v 1m
∑m
i=1 `(fw+v(x
′
i), yi)‖
‖w‖), (10)
*We find it works well in our experiments. With regard to the results on theoretical measurements or
guarantees for the maximization problem like Wang et al. [48], we leave it for further work.
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where m is the batch size, and v is layer-wise updated (refer to Appendix D for details). Similar to
generating adversarial examples x′ via FGSM (one-step) or PGD (multi-step), v can also be solved
by one-step or multi-step methods. Then, we can alternately generate x′ and calculate v for a number
of iterations A. As shortly will be shown in Section 5.2, one iteration for A and one-step for v
(default settings) are enough to get good robustness improvements.
Model Training. Finally, we update the parameters of the perturbed model fw+v using SGD. Note
that after optimizing the loss of a perturbed point on the landscape, we should come back to the center
point again for the next start. Thus, the actual parameter update follows:
w← (w + v)− η3∇w+v 1
m
m∑
i=1
`(fw+v(x
′
i, yi))− v. (11)
The complete pseudo-code of AT-AWP and extensions of AWP to other adversarial training ap-
proaches like TRADES, MART and RST are shown in Appendix D.
4.3 Theoretical Analysis
We also provide a theoretical view on why AWP works. Based on previous work on
PAC-Bayes bound [31], in adversarial training, let `(·, ·) be 0-1 loss, then ρ(w) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 max‖x′i−xi‖p≤ `(fw(x
′
i), yi) ∈ [0, 1]. Given a “prior” distribution P (a common assump-
tion is zero mean, σ2 variance Gaussian distribution) over the weights, the expected error of the
classifier can be bounded with probability at least 1− δ over the draw of n training data:
E{xi,yi}ni=1,u[ρ(w + u)] ≤ ρ(w) +
{
Eu[ρ(w + u)]− ρ(w)
}
+ 4
√
1
n
KL(w + u‖P ) + ln 2n
δ
.
(12)
Following Neyshabur et al. [31], we choose u as a zero mean spherical Gaussian perturbation with
variance σ2 in every direction, and set the variance of the perturbation to the weight with respect to its
magnitude σ = α‖w‖, which makes the third term of Eq. (12) become a constant 4
√
1
n (
1
2α + ln
2n
δ ).
Thus, the robust generalization gap is bounded by the second term that is the expectation of the
flatness of weight loss landscape. Considering the optimization efficiency and effectiveness on
expectation, Eu[ρ(w + u)] ≤ maxu[ρ(w + u)]. AWP exactly optimizes the worst-case of the
flatness of weight loss landscape {maxu[ρ(w + u)]− ρ(w)} to control the above PAC-Bayes bound,
which theoretically justifies why AWP works.
4.4 A Case Study on Vanilla AT and AT-AWP
In this part, we conduct a case study on vanilla AT and AT-AWP across three benchmark datasets
(SVHN [30], CIFAR-10 [20], CIFAR-100 [20]) and two threat models (L∞ and L2) using PreAct
ResNet-18 for 200 epochs. We follow the same settings in Rice et al. [37]: for L∞ threat model,
 = 8/255, step size is 1/255 for SVHN, and 2/255 for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100; for L2 threat
model,  = 128/255, step size is 15/255 for all datasets. The training/test attacks are PGD-10/PGD-
20 respectively. For AT-AWP, γ = 1 × 10−2. The test robustness is reported in Table 1 (natural
accuracy is in Appendix E) where “best” means the highest robustness that ever achieved at different
checkpoints for each dataset and threat model while “last” means the robustness at the last epoch
checkpoint. We can see that AT-AWP consistently improves the test robustness for all cases. It
indicates that AWP is generic and can be applied on various threat models and datasets.
Table 1: Test robustness (%) of AT and AT-AWP across different datasets and threat models. We omit
the standard deviations of 5 runs as they are very small (< 0.40%), which hardly effect the results.
Threat Model Method SVHN CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
Best Last Best Last Best Last
L∞
AT 53.36 44.49 52.79 44.44 27.22 20.82
AT-AWP 59.12 55.87 55.39 54.73 30.71 30.28
L2
AT 66.87 65.03 69.15 65.93 41.33 35.27
AT-AWP 72.57 67.73 72.69 72.08 45.60 44.66
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Table 2: Test robustness (%) on CIFAR-10 using WideResNet under L∞ threat model. We omit the
standard deviations of 5 runs as they are very small (< 0.40%), which hardly effect the results.
Defense Natural FGSM PGD-20 PGD-100 CW∞ SPSA AA
AT 86.07 61.76 56.10 55.79 54.19 61.40 52.60 ¶
AT-AWP 85.57 62.90 58.14 57.94 55.96 62.65 54.04
TRADES 84.65 61.32 56.33 56.07 54.20 61.10 53.08
TRADES-AWP 85.36 63.49 59.27 59.12 57.07 63.85 56.17
MART 84.17 61.61 58.56 57.88 54.58 58.90 51.10
MART-AWP 84.43 63.98 60.68 59.32 56.37 62.75 54.23
Pre-training 87.89 63.27 57.37 56.80 55.95 62.55 54.92
Pre-training-AWP 88.33 66.34 61.40 61.21 59.28 65.55 57.39
RST 89.69 69.60 62.60 62.22 60.47 67.60 59.53
RST-AWP 88.25 67.94 63.73 63.58 61.62 68.72 60.05
5 Experiments
In this section, we conduct comprehensive experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of AWP including
its benchmarking robustness, ablation studies and comparisons to other regularization techniques.
5.1 Benchmarking the State-of-the-art Robustness
In this part, we evaluate the robustness of our proposed AWP on CIFAR-10 to benchmark the state-
of-the-art robustness against white-box and black-box attacks. Two types of adversarial training
methods are considered here: One is only based on original data: 1) AT [25]; 2) TRADES [58]; and
3) MART [49]. The other uses additional data: 1) Pre-training [16]; and 2) RST [6].
Experimental Settings. For CIFAR-10 under L∞ attack with  = 8/255, we train WideResNet-
34-10 for AT, TRADES, and MART, while WideResNet-28-10 for Pre-training and RST, following
their original papers. For pre-training, we fine-tune 50 epochs using a learning rate of 0.001 as [16].
Other defenses are trained for 200 epochs using SGD with momentum 0.9, weight decay 5× 10−4,
and an initial learning rate of 0.1 that is divided by 10 at the 100-th and 150-th epoch. Simple data
augmentations such as 32 × 32 random crop with 4-pixel padding and random horizontal flip are
applied. The training attack is PGD-10 with step size 2/255. For AWP, we set γ = 5× 10−3. Other
hyper-parameters of the baselines are configured as per their original papers.
White-box/Black-box Robustness. Table 2 reports the “best” test robustness (the highest robustness
ever achieved at different checkpoints for each defense against each attack) against white-box and
black-box attacks. “Natural” denotes the accuracy on natural test examples. First, for white-box
attack, we test FGSM, PGD-20/100, and CW∞ (L∞ version of CW loss optimized by PGD-100).
AWP almost improves the robustness of state-of-the-art methods against all types of attacks. This
is because AWP aims at achieving a flat weight loss landscape, which is generic across different
methods. Second, for black-box attack, we test the query-based attack SPSA [45] (100 iterations with
perturbation size 0.001 (for gradient estimation), learning rate 0.01, and 256 samples for each gradient
estimation). Again, the robustness improved by AWP is consistent amongst different methods. In
addition, we test AWP against Auto Attack (AA) [9], which is a strong and reliable attack to verify
the robustness via an ensemble of diverse parameter-free attacks including three white-box attacks
(APGD-CE [9], APGD-DLR [9], and FAB [8]) and a black-box attack (Square Attack [1]). Compared
with their leaderboard results†, AWP can further boost their robustness, ranking the 1st on both with
and without additional data. Even some AWP methods without additional data can surpass the results
under additional data‡. This verifies that AWP improves adversarial robustness reliably rather than
improper tuning of hyper-parameters of attacks, gradient obfuscation or masking.
¶Here is the result on WideResNet-34-10 while the leaderborder one is on WideResNet-34-20.
†https://github.com/fra31/auto-attack
‡https://github.com/csdongxian/AWP/tree/main/auto_attacks
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5.2 Ablation Studies on AWP
In this part, we delve into AWP to investigate its each component. We train PreAct ResNet-18 using
vanilla AT and AT-AWP with L∞ threat model with  = 8/255 for 200 epochs following the same
setting in Section 5.1. The training/test attacks are PGD-10/PGD-20 (step size 2/255) respectively.
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Figure 2: The ablation study experiments on CIFAR-10 using AT-AWP unless otherwise specified.
Analysis on Optimization Strategy. Recalling Section 4.2, there are 3 parameters when optimizing
AWP, i.e., step number K1 in generating adversarial example x′, step number K2 in solving adver-
sarial weight perturbation v, and alternation iteration A between x′ and v. For step number K1 in
generating x′, previous work has showed that PGD-10 based AT usually obtains good robustness
[48], so we set K1 = 10 by default. For step number K2 in solving v, we assess AT-AWP with
K2 ∈ {1, 5, 10} while keeping A = 1. The green bars in Figure 2(a) show that varying K2 achieves
almost the same test robustness. For alternation iteration A, we test A ∈ {1, 2, 3} while keeping
K2 = 1. The orange bars show that one iteration (A = 1) already has 55.39% test robustness, and
extra iterations only bring few improvements but with much overhead. Based on these results, the
default setting for AWP is A = 1,K1 = 10,K2 = 1 whose training time overhead is ∼ 8%.
Analysis on Weight Perturbation. Here, we explore the effect of weight perturbation size (direction
will be analyzed in Section 5.3) from two aspects: size constraint γ and size measurement norm.
The test robustness with varying γ on AT-AWP and TRADES-AWP are shown in Figure 2(b).
We can see that both methods can achieve notable robustness improvements in a certain range
γ ∈ [1× 10−3, 5× 10−3]. It implies that the perturbation size cannot be too small to ineffectively
regularize the flatness of weight loss landscape and also cannot be too large to make DNNs hard to
train. Once γ is properly selected, it has a relatively good transferability across different methods
(improvements of AT-AWP and TRADES-AWP have an overlap on γ, though their highest points
are not the same). As for the size measurement norm, L1 and L2 (also called Frobenius norm LF )
almost have no difference on test robustness.
Effect on Weight Loss Landscape and Robust Generalization Gap. We visualize the weight loss
landscape of AT-AWP with different γ in Figure 2(c) and present its corresponding training/test
robustness in Figure 2(d). The gray line of γ = 0 is the vanilla AT (without AWP). As γ grows,
the regularization becomes stronger, thus the weight loss landscape becomes flatter. Accordingly,
the robust generalization gap becomes smaller. This verifies that AWP indeed brings flatter weight
loss landscape and smaller robust generalization gap. In addition, the flattest weight loss landscape
(smallest robust generalization gap) is obtained at a large γ = 2×10−2 but its training/test robustness
decreases, which implies that γ should be properly selected by balancing the training robustness and
the flatness of weight loss landscape to obtain the test robustness improvement.
5.3 Comparisons to Other Regularization Techniques
In this part, we compare AWP with other regularizations using the same setting as Section 5.2.
Comparison to Random Weight Perturbation (RWP). We evaluate the difference of AWP and
RWP from the following 3 views: 1) Adversarial loss of AT pre-trained model perturbed by RWP and
AWP. As shown in Figure 3(a), RWP only has an obvious increase of adversarial loss at a extremely
large γ = 1 (others are similar to pre-trained AT (γ = 0)), while AWP (red line) has much higher
adversarial loss than others just using a very small perturbation (γ = 5× 10−3). Therefore, AWP can
find the worst-case perturbation in a small region while RWP needs a relatively large perturbation. 2)
Weight loss landscape of models trained by AT-RWP and AT-AWP. As shown in Figure 3(b), RWP
only flattens the weight loss landscape at a large γ ≥ 0.6. Even, RWP under γ = 1 can only obtain a
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Figure 3: Comparisons of AWP and other regularization techniques (the values in (a)/(c) legend are γ
in RWP unless otherwise specified) on CIFAR-10 using PreAct ResNet-18 and L∞ threat model.
similar flatter weight loss landscape as AWP under γ = 5× 10−3. 3) Robustness. We test AT-AWP
and AT-RWP with a large range γ ∈ [1× 10−4, 2.0]. Figure 3(c) (solid/dashed lines are test/training
robustness respectively) shows that AWP can significantly improve the test robustness at a small
γ ∈ [1× 10−3, 1× 10−2]. For RWP, the test robustness almost does not improve at γ ≤ 0.3 because
of the unchanged weight loss landscape, even begins to decrease when γ ≥ 0.6. This is because such
a large weight perturbation makes DNNs hard to train and severely reduces the training robustness
(dashed blue line), which in turns reduces the test robustness though the weight loss landscape is
flattened. In summary, AWP is much better than RWP for weight perturbation.
Comparison to Weight Regularization and Data Augmentation. Here, we compare AWP (γ =
5× 10−3) with L1/L2 weight regularization and data augmentation of mixup [59]/cutout [11]. We
follow the best hyper-parameters tuned in Rice et al. [37]: λ = 5 × 10−6/5 × 10−3 for L1/L2
regularization respectively, patch length 14 for cutout, and α = 1.4 for mixup. We show the test
robustness (natural accuracy is in Appendix F) of all checkpoints for different methods in Figure 3(d).
The vanilla AT achieves the best robustness after the first learning rate decay and starts overfitting.
Other techniques, except of AWP, do not obtain a better robustness than early stopped AT (AT-ES),
which is consistent with the observations in Rice et al. [37]. However, AWP (red line) behaves very
differently from the others: it does improve the best robustness (52.79% of vanilla AT→ 55.39%
of AT-AWP). AWP shows its superiority over other weight regularization and data augmentation,
and improves the best robustness further compared with early stopping. More experiments under L2
threat model could be found in Appendix F, which also demonstrates the effectiveness of AWP.
5.4 A Closer Look at the Weights Learned by AWP
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Figure 4: Weight distribution
In this part, we explore how the distribution of weights changes
when we apply AWP on it. We plot the histogram of weight values
in different layers, and find that AT-AWP and vanilla AT are similar
in shallower layers, while AT-AWP has smaller magnitudes and a
more symmetric distribution in deeper layers. Figure 4 demonstrates
the distribution of weight values in the last convolutional layer of
PreAct ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10 dataset.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we characterized the weight loss landscape using the on-the-fly generated adversarial
examples, and identified that the weight loss landscape is closely related to the robust generalization
gap. Several well-recognized adversarial training variants all introduce a flatter weight loss landscape
though they use different techniques to improve adversarial robustness. Based on these findings, we
proposed Adversarial Weight Perturbation (AWP) to directly make the weight loss landscape flat, and
developed a double-perturbation (adversarially perturbing both inputs and weights) mechanism in
the adversarial training framework. Comprehensive experiments show that AWP is generic and can
improve the state-of-the-art adversarial robustness across different adversarial training approaches,
network architectures, threat models, and benchmark datasets.
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Broader Impact
Adversarial training is the currently most effective and promising defense against adversarial examples.
In this work, we propose AWP to improve the robustness of adversarial training, which may help
to build a more secure and robust deep learning system in real world. At the same time, AWP
introduces extra computation, which probably has negative impacts on the environmental protection
(e.g., low-carbon). Further, the authors do not want this paper to bring overoptimism about AI safety
to the society. The majority of adversarial examples are based on known threat models (e.g. Lp in
this paper), and the robustness is also achieved on them. Meanwhile, the deployed machine learning
system faces attacks from all sides, and we are still far from complete model robustness.
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A Adversarial Attack
Given a natural example xi with class label yi and a DNN model fw, the goal of an adversary is to
find an adversarial example x′i that fools the network to make incorrect predictions while still remains
in the -ball centered at xi (‖x′i − xi‖p ≤ ). A lot of attacking methods have been proposed for the
crafting of adversarial examples. Here, we only name a few.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [12]. FGSM perturbs the natural example xi for one step by
the amount of  along the gradient direction:
x′i = xi +  · sign(∇xi`(fw(xi), yi)). (13)
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [25]. PGD perturbs the natural example xi for K1 steps with
small step size η1. After each step of perturbation, PGD projects the adversarial example back onto
the -ball of xi, if it goes beyond the -ball:
x
′(k+1)
i = Π
(
x
′(k)
i + η1 · sign(∇x′i`(fw(x
′(k)
i ), yi))
)
, (14)
where Π(·) is the projection operation, and x′(k)i is the adversarial example at the k-th step. There are
also other types of attacks including Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [32], Carlini and
Wagner (CW) [5], and so on.
B Details for the Weight Loss Landscape Visualization Method
In this section, we first provide the pseudo-code of our proposed visualization method for the weight
loss landscape in the adversarial training, and then verify its reliability.
B.1 Pseudo-code of the Visualization Method
As shown in Algorithm 1 for the visualization of weight loss landscape, we firstly sample a random
direction d from a Gaussian distribution. Then, we apply the “filter normalization” technique (Line
3-7) from Li et al. [21] to avoid the scaling effect§ of DNNs. Next, we calculate the adversarial loss
for a series of perturbed weights independently, i.e., ρ(w + αd), α ∈ {αmin, · · · , αmax}. For a
given perturbed weights w + αd, we generate its own adversarial examples using PGD following
Madry et al. [25] (Line 9-14). Then, we approximate the adversarial loss of the current perturbed
model fw+αd by the cross-entropy loss on these on-the-fly generated adversarial examples (Line 15).
Finally, we plot the weight loss landscape (Line 17).
B.2 Reliability of the 1-D Visualization
To improve the trustworthiness of our results, we check the reliability of our visualization method
from two perspectives: 1) repeatability; 2) comparisons to 2-D visualization.
Repeatability. We first investigate whether different random directions produce dramatically different
plots. We show the weight loss landscape of PreAct ResNet-18 during vanilla adversarial training
along 10 randomly selected directions in Figure 5. We find the plots of the same checkpoint are very
close in shape, which indicates the stability of our visualization method.
Comparisons to 2-D Visualization. Next, we explore whether 1-D visualization obtains similar
results to 2-D visualization (a much time-consuming method). The 2-D visualization introduces an
extra random filter-normalized direction e, and plots g(α, β) = ρ(w + αd + βe). Different from
the standard training scenario where near-zero loss on the training set can be always achieved, the
adversarial loss on the training set is usually larger than zero, i.e., the center point g(0, 0) in the
weight loss landscape is often larger than zero, which hampers the comparison on the flatness of
weight loss landscape. Therefore, we visualize the relative weight loss landscape |g(α, β)− g(0, 0)|
instead. Figure 6 presents the 2-D visualization of the same model as Figure 5 at the 100-th, 140-th
and 200-th epoch checkpoint. We can see that the weight loss landscape is flatter at the 100-th epoch
and sharper at the 200-th epoch, which is compatible to the findings from the 1-D visualization. For
time costs, it consumes ∼ 4 days for the 2-D visualization of a single adversarially trained PreAct
§In DNNs with ReLU activation, the network remains unchanged if we multiply the weights in one layer by
10, and divide by 10 at the next layer.
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Algorithm 1 Visualization of Weight Loss Landscape
1: Input: Network fw with L-layer (Fl filters in the l-th layer), training data {(xi, yi)}ni=1, PGD
step size η1, PGD step number K1, the scalar parameter α ∈ [αmin, αmax].
2: Sample a random direction d ∼ N (0, 1)
3: for l = 1, . . . , L do
4: for j = 1, . . . , Fl do
5: dl,j ← dl,j‖dl,j‖F ‖wl,j‖F
6: end for
7: end for
8: for α = αmin, · · · , αmax do
9: for i = 1, . . . , n (in parallel) do
10: x′i ← xi + δ, where δ ∼ Uniform(−1, 1)
11: for k = 1, · · · ,K1 do
12: x′i ← Π
(
x′i + η1sign(∇x′i`(fw+αd(x′i), yi))
)
13: end for
14: end for
15: ρ(w + αd)← 1n
∑n
i=1 `(fw+αd(x
′
i), yi)
16: end for
17: Plot (α, ρ(w + αd)),∀α ∈ [αmin, αmax]
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Figure 5: Repeatability of the 1-D visualization along 10 different random directions.
ResNet-18 using one GeForce RTX 2080Ti, while it is ∼ 2 hours for the 1-D visualization of the
same model. Thus, we adopt the 1-D visualization in most cases.
From the above experiments, we can conclude that our 1-D visualization method can characterize the
property of the high-dimensional weight loss landscape reliably and efficiently.
C More Evidence for the Connection of Weight Loss Landscape and Robust
Generalization Gap
In this section, we provide more empricial evidence to identify the connection of the weight loss
landscape and the robust generalization gap across learning rate schedules, model architectures,
datasets, and threat models.
C.1 The Connection across Learning Rate Schedules
To investigate whether the learning rate schedule affects the connection of weight loss landscape and
robust generalization gap, we test another two commonly used learning rate schedules:
• Cosine schedule [22]: We decrease the learning rate lr using the cosine function from 0.1 to
0 over 200 epochs, i.e., lr = 0.05(cos(pit/200) + 1)) at the t-th epoch [6];
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Figure 6: 2-D visualization of weight loss landscape at the different epoch checkpoints.
• Cyclic schedule [41]: We increase lr linearly from 0 to some maximum (0.2 at the 80-th
epoch), and then decrease it linearly to 0 until 200-th epoch [51].
We adversarially train PreAct ResNet-18 with different learning rate schedules using the same
experimental settings in Section 3. The learning curves are shown on the left column in Figure
7, where the whole training process can be split into two stages: the early stage with small robust
generalization gap (≤ 10%) and the late stage with large robust generalization gap (> 10%). In
Figure 7, the weight loss landscapes of checkpoints at different epochs from the early stage (blue
curves) are on the middle column, while the weight loss landscapes from the late stage (red curves)
are on the right column. Due to the different learning rate schedules, the robust generalization gap
becomes large at different epochs. The cosine schedule enlarges the robust generalization gap after
the 120-th epoch with lr < 0.34. The weight loss landscape becomes sharper correspondingly. The
cyclic schedule starts to significantly enlarge the gap much later, almost after the 175-th epoch with
lr < 0.16. Meanwhile, the weight loss landscape also becomes sharp much later. Generally, no
matter which epoch and learning rate it is, we can always find that the weight loss landscape becomes
sharper immediately after the robust generalization gap increases, which implies a clear correlation
between weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap.
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(b) Cyclic schedule
Figure 7: The relationship between weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap across
learning rate schedules (cosine and cyclic) with PreAct ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10 under L∞ attack.
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C.2 The Connection across Model Architectures
The previous experiments are all based on PreAct ResNet-18. Here we additionally conduct ex-
periments with VGG-19 [40] and WideResNet-34-10 [56] to verify the connection across network
architectures. The same experimental settings as Section 3 are adopted and the results are shown
in Figure 8. They all behave similarly: once the robust generalization gap increases (after the first
learning rate decay), the weight loss landscape becomes sharper. This indicates that the connection of
weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap still exists across architectures.
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(a) VGG-19
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(b) WideResNet-34-10
Figure 8: The relationship between weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap across model
architectures (VGG-19 and WideResNet-34-10) on CIFAR-10 using piece-wise learning rate schedule
and L∞ attack.
C.3 The Connection across Datasets
Next, we demonstrate that the connection is an universal phenomenon across datasets on CIFAR-100
[20] and SVHN [30]. We adversarially train PreAct ResNet-18 on different datasets with the same
settings as Section 3. The results are shown in Figure 9. The phenomenon on CIFAR-100 is similar
to that on CIFAR-10, i.e., after the first learning rate decay, the robust generalization gap becomes
larger and the weight loss landscape becomes sharper as well. For SVHN, the robust generalization
gap increases significantly even earlier: it almost achieves its highest robustness around 10-th epoch,
and starts overfitting. Meanwhile, the weight loss landscape also keeps flat at 10-th epoch and
starts to become sharper. In conclusion, the strong connection of weight loss landscape and robust
generalization gap is universal across datasets.
C.4 The Connection on L2 Threat Model
To further explore the universality of the connection, we additionally conduct experiments on L2
threat model in Figure 10. The other experimental settings are the same as Section 3. Under the L2
threat model, the connection still exists: once the robust generalization gap increases (after the first
learning rate decay), the weight loss landscape becomes sharper.
D Algorithms for the AWP-based Defense
In this section, we first provide the pseudo-code of the AWP-based vanilla advesraial trainig (AT-
AWP), and then describe how to satisfy the constraint of the perturbation size in Eq. (8) via the
weight update in Eq. (10) and the extensions to other AT variants (TRADES, MART, and RST).
D.1 Pseudo-code of AT-AWP
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(b) SVHN
Figure 9: The relationship between weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap across
datasets (CIFAR-100 and SVHN) with PreAct ResNet-18 using piece-wise learning rate schedule
and L∞ attack.
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(a) L2 threat model
Figure 10: The relationship between weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap with PreAct
ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10 using piece-wise learning rate schedule and L2 attack.
Algorithm 2 AT-AWP
1: Input: Network fw, training data {(xi, yi)}ni=1, batch size m, learning rate η3, PGD step size
η1, PGD steps K1, AWP constraint γ, AWP step size η2, AWP steps K2, alternate iteration A.
2: Output: Robust model fw.
3: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
4: for a = 0 to A− 1 do
5: for i = 1, . . . ,m (in parallel) do
6: x′i ← xi + δ, where δ ∼ Uniform(−1, 1)
7: for k = 1, · · · ,K1 do
8: x′i ← Π
(
x′i + η1sign(∇x′i`(fw+v(x′i), yi))
)
9: end for
10: end for
11: for k = 1, . . . ,K2 do
12: v← Πγ
(
v + η2
∇v 1m
∑
i `(fw+v(x
′
i),yi)
‖∇v 1m
∑
i `(fw+v(x
′
i),yi)‖
‖w‖)
13: end for
14: end for
15: w← (w + v)− η3∇w+v 1m
∑
i `(fw+v(x
′
i, yi))− v
16: end for
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D.2 Details for the Weight Update under the Constraint
Recall that we restrict the weight perturbation vl in the l-th layer using its relative size to the
corresponding weight wl, i.e., ‖vl‖ ≤ γ‖wl‖. To implement this restriction on weight perturbation,
we apply a layer-wise projection operation, i.e., once the weight perturbation is out of the ball, we
project it back onto the surface of the ball. We have the following layer-wise projection operator,
Πγ(v) =
γ
‖wl‖
‖vl‖ vl, if ‖vl‖ > γ‖wl‖,∀l ∈ {1, · · · , L}
vl, if ‖vl‖ ≤ γ‖wl‖,∀l ∈ {1, · · · , L}.
(15)
By default, we set η2 = γA·K2 (the notations refer to Algorithm 2).
D.3 Extensions of AWP to Other Adversarial Training Methods
Our proposed AWP is a general method and can be easily extended to other well-recognized ad-
versarial training variants including TRADES, MART and RST where the only difference is the
method-specific adversarial loss in Eq. (1).
Specifically, for AWP-based TRADES (TRADES-AWP), we also first generate adversarial examples
following TRADES method,
x′i ← Π
(
x′i + η1sign(∇x′iKL(fw+v(xi)‖fw+v(x′i)))
)
, (16)
and then the AWP v and the DNN parameter w of TRADES are updated similarly following Eq.
(10) and Eq. (11) respectively, where `(fw+v(x′i), yi) is TRADES-specific as CE(fw+v(xi), yi) +
β · KL(fw+v(xi)‖fw+v(x′i)).
Similarly, for AWP-based MART (MART-AWP), we generate adversarial examples following MART
method,
x′i ← Π
(
x′i + η1sign(∇x′i`(fw+v(x′i), yi))
)
, (17)
and then update the AWP v follow Eq. (10). Next, the DNN parameter w of MART is updated using
Eq. (11), where `(fw+v(x′i), yi) is MART-specific loss as BCE(fw(x
′
i), yi)+λ·KL(fw(xi)‖fw(x′i))·
(1− [fw(xi)]yi).
RST, as an SSL-based method, first generates pseudo labels for unlabeled data, and then adversarially
train DNNs using TRADES loss on the new dataset which consists of labeled data and unlabeled data
with pseudo labels. Thus, we can incorporate AWP into RST just like TRADES-AWP.
E More Results for Section 4.3: A Case Study on Vanilla AT and AT-AWP
Following Section 4.3, we provide the complete results (test robustness and natural accuracy) of
AT and AT-AWP in Table 3. Under L2 threat model, AWP improves both the robustness and
natural accuracy on all datasets. While under L∞ threat model, AWP improves the robustness on
condition of sacrificing the natural accuracy on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. This maybe because
natural images (CIFAR) are more complicated than color digits (SVHN). However, for robustness,
AWP demonstrates a general behaviour that consistently improves the best and last robustness by a
recognizable gain across datasets and threat models.
F More Experiments on Comparison to Other Regularization Techniques
Following Section 5.3, here we provide the complete results (test robustness and natural accuracy)
of AWP and several regularization techniques under both L∞ and L2 threat models on CIFAR-
10. Under the L∞ threat model, we follow the best hyper-parameters tuned in Rice et al. [37]:
λ = 5 × 10−6/5 × 10−3 for L1/L2 regularization respectively, patch length 14 for cutout, and
α = 1.4 for mixup. Under the L2 threat model, we use the same hyper-parameters since we find that
they almost have the same trends after parameter tuning. For AWP, we all set γ = 5 × 10−3. We
use the same training settings as Section 5.2 and the test attack is PGD-20. We show test robustness
and test natural accuracy in Table 4 (L∞ threat model) and Table 5 (L2 threat model). We find AWP
indeed improves the test robustness of both the best checkpoint and the last checkpoint by a notable
margin. Besides, we visualize the learning curves in Figure 11. We find that AWP can constantly
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Table 3: Performance (%) of AT and AT-AWP on PreAct ResNet-18 across different datasets and
threat models over 5 random runs.
Dataset Norm Method
Robustness Natural accuracy
Best Last Best Last
SVHN
L∞
AT 53.36 ± 0.09 44.49 ± 0.27 92.18 ± 0.15 89.85 ± 0.33
AT-AWP 59.12 ± 0.26 55.87 ± 0.39 93.85 ± 0.11 92.59 ± 0.52
L2
AT 66.87 ± 0.25 65.03 ± 0.24 93.69 ± 0.12 93.25 ± 0.28
AT-AWP 72.57 ± 0.40 67.73 ± 0.21 95.95 ± 0.36 95.22 ± 0.27
CIFAR-10
L∞
AT 52.79 ± 0.21 44.44 ± 0.39 85.57 ± 0.16 84.56 ± 0.19
AT-AWP 55.39 ± 0.39 54.73 ± 0.16 82.00 ± 0.19 81.11 ± 0.39
L2
AT 69.15 ± 0.13 65.93 ± 0.35 89.57 ± 0.09 88.96 ± 0.18
AT-AWP 72.69 ± 0.19 72.08 ± 0.39 90.18 ± 0.31 89.71 ± 0.17
CIFAR-100
L∞
AT 27.22 ± 0.16 20.82 ± 0.20 56.33 ± 0.23 54.61 ± 0.33
AT-AWP 30.71 ± 0.25 30.28 ± 0.30 54.19 ± 0.39 54.39 ± 0.29
L2
AT 41.33 ± 0.09 35.27 ± 0.29 62.65 ± 0.11 60.50 ± 0.17
AT-AWP 45.60 ± 0.23 44.66 ± 0.22 65.07 ± 0.31 64.40 ± 0.41
improve the robustness under both L∞ and L2 threat models throughout the entire training process,
which demonstrates the superiority of AWP over other regularization methods.
In addition, we find AWP sacrifices the natural accuracy throughout the whole training on CIFAR-10
under L∞ threat model, which indicates AWP is still affected by the trade-off between robustness
and natural accuracy [58]. For L2 threat model on CIFAR-10, AWP just has similar natural accuracy
to vanilla AT. This is because L2 threat model ( = 128/255) is easier than L∞ threat model and
many techniques have the similar natural accuracy.
Table 4: Performance (%) of AT and AT with other regularization techniques on CIFAR-10 using
PreAct ResNet-18 under L∞ threat model ( = 8/288) over 5 random runs.
Method
Robustness Natural accuracy
Best Last Best Last
AT 52.79 ± 0.21 44.44 ± 0.39 85.57 ± 0.16 84.56 ± 0.19
+ L1 regularization 51.95 ± 0.51 48.76 ± 0.61 82.77 ± 0.37 83.42 ± 0.26
+ L2 regularization 51.60 ± 0.41 47.37 ± 0.52 81.05 ± 0.44 81.97 ± 0.50
+ Cutout 52.78 ± 0.14 50.37 ± 0.41 80.99 ± 0.19 83.46 ± 0.33
+ Mixup 52.87 ± 0.47 49.76 ± 0.81 78.76 ± 0.61 78.50 ± 1.21
AT-AWP 55.39 ± 0.39 54.73 ± 0.16 82.00 ± 0.19 81.11 ± 0.39
Table 5: Performance (%) of AT and AT with other regularization techniques on CIFAR-10 using
PreAct ResNet-18 under L2 threat model ( = 128/255) over 5 random runs.
Method
Robustness Natural accuracy
Best Last Best Last
AT 69.15 ± 0.13 65.93 ± 0.35 89.57 ± 0.09 88.96 ± 0.18
+ L1 regularization 67.99 ± 0.27 63.75 ± 0.40 88.04 ± 0.19 88.49 ± 0.27
+ L2 regularization 67.78 ± 0.33 63.62 ± 0.46 88.57 ± 0.14 87.75 ± 0.23
+ Cutout 69.38 ± 0.27 67.68 ± 0.30 88.36 ± 0.31 88.01 ± 0.26
+ Mixup 70.11 ± 0.50 68.20 ± 0.46 87.29 ± 0.71 86.91 ± 0.94
AT-AWP 72.69 ± 0.19 72.08 ± 0.39 90.18 ± 0.31 89.71 ± 0.17
19
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Epoch
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
Te
st
 ro
bu
st
ne
ss
 (%
)
AT
+ L1 reg
+ L2 reg
+ Mixup
+ Cutout
AT-ES
AT-AWP
(a) Test robustness under `∞ threat model
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Epoch
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Na
tu
ra
l a
cc
ur
ac
y 
(%
)
AT
+ L1 reg
+ L2 reg
+ Mixup
+ Cutout
AT-ES
AT-AWP
(b) Natural accuracy under `∞ threat model
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Epoch
30
40
50
60
70
80
Te
st
 ro
bu
st
ne
ss
 (%
)
AT
+ L1 reg
+ L2 reg
+ Mixup
+ Cutout
AT-ES
AT-AWP
(c) Test robustness under `2 threat model
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Epoch
40
50
60
70
80
90
Na
tu
ra
l a
cc
ur
ac
y 
(%
)
AT
+ L1 reg
+ L2 reg
+ Mixup
+ Cutout
AT-ES
AT-AWP
(d) Natural accuracy under `2 threat model
Figure 11: Performance (%) on the test set of CIFAR-10 during the training for AT, AT-AWP, and AT
with other regularization techniques.
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